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PERSPECTIvES
Antidepressants and Advertising: 
Psychopharmaceuticals in crisis
Nathan P. Greenslit, PhDa*, and Ted J. Kaptchukb
aHistory of Science Department, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts;
bProgram in Placebo Studies, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Boston, 
Massachusetts
As the efficacy and science of psychopharmaceuticals has become increasingly uncertain,
marketing of these drugs to both physicians and consumers continues to a central part of a
multi-billion dollar per year industry in the United States. We explore how such drug mar-
keting portrays idealized scientific relationships between psychopharmaceuticals and de-
pression; how multiple stakeholders, including scientists, regulatory agencies, and patient
advocacy groups, negotiate neurobiological explanations of mental illness; and how the
placebo effect has become a critical issue in these debates, including the possible role of
drug advertising to influence the placebo effect directly. We argue that if and how antide-
pressants “work” is not a straightforward objective question, but rather a larger social con-
test involving scientific debate, the political history of the pharmaceutical industry, cultural
discourses surrounding the role of drugs in society, and the interpretive flexibility of personal
experience.
introduction
Psychopharmaceuticals are currently in
crisis, and the science of depression has be-
come a contest between scientists, pharma-
ceutical marketing, physicians, professional
medical organizations, regulatory agencies,
and patients. Public controversies and med-
ical  uncertainties  concerning  antidepres-
sants have become the norm [1,2,3]. Since
direct-to-consumer (DTC†) advertising was
approved by the FDA in 1997 [4], pharma-
ceutical companies have been accused of
exaggerating claims of drug efficacy [5],
downplaying the health risks of antidepres-
sant use [6,7,8], and hiding behind smoke-
screen public relations slogans of medical
“awareness campaigns,” while slyly grow-
ing  drug  markets  by  over-medicalizing
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ety, and shyness [9,10]. In this controversial
arena, the science of antidepressants has be-
come uncertain, and physicians, policymak-
ers, and consumers are left with few brute
facts about if and how antidepressants work.
Yet physicians want effective medicines, pa-
tients and policymakers want clarity of in-
formation, and pharmaceutical companies
need to appear to be providing both. To pro-
vide a better understanding of the current
predicament around psychopharmaceuticals,
this article will look at three issues: 1) How
pharmaceutical advertisements and profes-
sional marketing literature portray an ideal-
ized  and  simplistic  relationship  between
medications and psychiatric illness; 2) how
other stakeholders (patients, scientists, physi-
cians, regulatory agencies, professional so-
cieties)  accept  or  challenge  a  simple
neurobiology of mental illness; and 3) how
the placebo effect has become an increas-
ingly important issue in these debates, in-
cluding the new role of drug advertising to
influence the placebo effect directly. 
Selling Science
Over the past decade, drug companies
have launched extensive physician-directed
and  direct-to-consumer  advertising  cam-
paigns to disseminate putative neuroscien-
tific theories about mental illness. These ads
are designed to convince doctors and pa-
tients that psychopharmaceuticals have an
obvious, objective, and scientific relation-
ship to the symptoms they are supposed to
treat. Shortly after its FDA approval in 1987
[11], the first Prozac (fluoxetine) ads that ap-
peared in medical journals claimed, “There
is considerable evidence that serotonergic
function may be reduced in the brains of de-
pressed patients,” introducing Prozac as “a
specifically-different antidepressant . . . Its
distinctive chemistry means greater speci-
ficity.” The advertisement never claimed
that Prozac would be any more efficacious
than any other antidepressant. Rather, it fo-
cused on how the drug was chemically dis-
tinct from others, emphasizing that it had
comparatively more specific action on neu-
rochemical receptors. However, the rhetori-
cal effect of using neuroscience in drug ad-
vertising  is  precisely  to  imply  that
pharmacological specificity translates into a
more  efficacious  psychopharmaceutical.
Since  the  original  Prozac  campaign,  the
medical image of psychopharmacological
specificity has become increasingly fine-
grained. A 2005 physician-directed ad for
Remeron (mirtazapine) asked, “What’s the
difference between SSRIs [selective sero-
tonin reuptake inhibitors] and Remeron?”
The answer: “SSRIs . . . Somewhat Selec-
tive; Remeron . . . Downright Picky. [Re-
meron  offers]  novel  nonadrenergic  and
serotonergic pharmacological action.” This
campaign capitalizes on the original “magic
bullet” image of the SSRI, depicting how
mirtazapine binds to a single subtype of the
serotonin  receptor.  Just  like  the  earlier
Prozac ad, the Remeron ad does not promise
greater efficacy, but rather more exact sci-
ence.
Drug advertising seeks to fill in an ex-
planatory gap between the bench science of
psychopharmacology and the palpable or
measurable real-world effects of antidepres-
sants.  While  the  pharmaceutical  industry
uses placebo-controlled clinical trials to es-
tablish that a given antidepressant is effec-
tive, these trials are neither designed nor
intended  to  show  why  an  antidepressant
might work at all. Do patients experience
symptom relief because their drug acts on a
distinct  underlying  disease  pathology  (as
pharmaceutical ads imply) or because their
drug induces a psychoactive state (e.g., se-
dation, stimulation, or altered sense percep-
tion) [12]? There’s a lot at stake in deciding
between  these  explanatory  frameworks,
since the science of mental illness and psy-
chopharmaceuticals is contentious [13]. Not
only do neuroscientists debate the most basic
of biological mechanisms that may be in-
volved in depression, but some recent analy-
ses of clinical trial data suggest that, overall,
SSRI antidepressants like Prozac and Effexor
(venlafaxine) do not work much better than
placebos [14,15,16]. Despite such broad un-
certainty over both the scientific explana-
tions and efficacy of antidepressants, DTC
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year industry (and practically unique to the
United States, as no other country except
New Zealand allows it) [17]. And antide-
pressants remain one of the most heavily ad-
vertised prescription drug categories [18].
Drug  marketing  gets  recruited  to  do
what science itself cannot: give meaning to
scientific results. In an industry magazine
editorial, one drug-marketing expert urged
fellow marketers to “[t]ell the truth. Seri-
ously, nothing sells like verisimilitude. Pre-
cise language and specific visuals, such as
those that show the size of the pill, the mech-
anism of action or the genuine outcome of
faithful compliance help create a reasonable
semblance of ‘truth’” [19]. This marketer’s
easy slippage from “truth” to “verisimili-
tude” to “reasonable semblance of truth”
suggests that the very idea that neuroscience
offers the truth of depression or anxiety is
split  between  claims  that  the  science  is
known and that it is unknown. In the middle
is a rhetorical gray area of imputation, sug-
gestion, and belief on the part of scientists,
psychiatrists, and consumer-patients alike.
In this middle comes the opportunity for
companies to market the unknown to the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and
to the public, to repeat the possibility of neu-
roscience so that it becomes common sense.
The idea that neuroscience offers the
“truth” of depression has gained remarkable
popular culture cache in recent years, shap-
ing our assumptions about the relationship
between mind, body, and brain. One recent
study concluded that neuroscience has a “se-
ductive allure,” after showing that college
students find theories of psychological phe-
nomena more credible if they include neuro-
scientific  terms,  irrespective  of  whether
neuroscience is actually relevant to the theo-
ries in question [20]. This finding resonates
with how drug marketers reflect on their own
advertising strategies: “Pharmaceutical com-
panies need to realize that consumers do not
care about your internal research. They do
not ask for your drug because it is well re-
searched. They ask because something you
said in the 35 seconds made them interested.
That is the end goal . . . Unfortunately, in the
scientific world of drug companies, ‘I think’
is not allowed. ‘I know, I proved’ is the lan-
guage rewarded” [21]. This quote comes
from a 2002 article in the industry journal
DTC Perspectives, published in the midst of
the first DTC blitz. It warns that the drug ad-
vertisement development process should not
mirror the drug development process. Since
the advent of DTC, drug marketers have
been honing how to give science market-dri-
ven meaning. Their professional literature
encourages marketers to fantasize how to
communicate to a market, before the drug is
even developed: “This point is counter-intu-
itive to many companies. Doesn’t the science
lead the way? Well, yes and no. Without the
science, there is no product at all. But here’s
what happens all too often with companies
who overemphasize the science at the ex-
pense of the messages: they may develop
very elegant answers to irrelevant questions”
[22]. The article continues to explain how
“market  perceptions  and  needs”  need  to
guide the science, not the other way around.
A brief SocioPoliticAl hiStory
of AntidePreSSAntS
The science of psychopharmaceuticals
is  also  contested  by  a  variety  of  social
groups, who fight over representations of
neuroscience  in  advertising.  On  the  one
hand, patient advocacy groups have either
embraced or resisted neuroscientific theories
in drug advertising, depending on whether
they interpret them as socially vindicating
(biological explanations as exculpatory for
stigmatized illnesses, such as premenstrual
dysphoric disorder or post-traumatic stress
disorder) or as socially constraining (bio-
logical explanations as oversimplified re-
ductions  of  cultural  or  psychological
complexity). On the other hand, advocacy
groups, some including psychiatrists, have
even filed complaints with the FDA and
Federal  Communications  Commission
(FCC), arguing that cartoons of SSRIs act-
ing on neurochemical receptors (featured in
Zoloft [sertraline] ads) are ultimately fraud-
ulent claims about depression and its under-
lying  biological  pathology,  because  the
155 Greenslit and Kaptchuk: Antidepressants and advertisingscience is still contentious. These contro-
versies demonstrate what social scientists
have observed concerning how seemingly
objective things, like scientific fact, actually
require a great deal of social work to be pro-
duced, circulated, and maintained.
Critiques over the neuroscience of anti-
depressants are caught up in larger sociomed-
ical quandaries over what counts as proper
medical uses of these drugs and how psychi-
atric illness should be defined and diagnosed in
the first place. Early television commercials
for Sarafem (fluoxetine hydrochloride, previ-
ously marketed as Prozac, which, at the time,
had just gone off-patent) for premenstrual dys-
phoric disorder (PMDD) depicted frustrated
women looking for lost car keys or trying to
extract shopping carts at grocery stores. The
FDA criticized these ads for not clearly distin-
guishing between PMDD and premenstrual
syndrome (PMS) and for “trivializing the seri-
ousness of PMDD.” The increased regulatory
scrutiny over DTC has made pharmaceutical
companies more strategic in how they tow the
line. As one marketer put it: “Ad agencies have
to be more creative than ever to create truly ef-
fective communications that are also respon-
sible and do not overpromise” [23].
The current debates over the science,
marketing, and uses of antidepressants are
born out of a unique history of the role of
drug therapy in psychiatric medicine [24].
Historically, American psychiatry has been
at the center of broader social tensions be-
tween mainstream social institutions, coun-
tercultural movements, and civil rights. In
the 1960s and 1970s, antipsychiatry groups
challenged the cultural authority of organ-
ized medicine, especially psychiatry, argu-
ing  that  it  was  an  institution  of  social
control. During this time, licit psychophar-
maceuticals  were  vilified  as  “chemical
straightjackets,” while illicit drugs that could
only be obtained without a physician's bless-
ing were celebrated as countercultural ex-
pressions of pleasure, mind expansion, and
self-exploration, as epitomized by people
like Ken Kesey and Timothy Leary. Benzo-
diazepines (such as Valium and Miltown)
were the first psychiatric drugs to occupy a
social middle ground between the two per-
ceptions; they were prescription medications
for the treatment of anxiety, but they were
also pleasurable and consumed recreation-
ally. But by the 1980s, prominent American
media  outlets,  including  The  New  York
Times, were reporting that Valium was over-
prescribed and overconsumed and that peo-
ple were becoming addicted to the drug. The
sociomedical boundary of licit versus illicit
got blurred in both directions.
Ever since the scandals surrounding the
(mis)uses of benzodiazepines, the pharma-
ceutical industry has been deeply invested
in the legal distinction between licit and il-
licit  drugs,  with  its  accompanying  dis-
courses  of  health  and  normality  versus
pleasure and dependency. One of the first
DTC  pamphlets  for  Prozac  claimed  that
“Prozac doesn’t artificially alter your mood
and it is not addictive. It can only make you
feel more like yourself by treating the im-
balance that causes depression.” Illicit ver-
sus  licit;  pleasure  versus  illness-healing;
changing-self versus real-self: These are all
distinctions that pharmaceutical marketing
and its regulatory environment demand. But
they also express social ambivalence over
wanting drugs, yet fearing they will overstep
medical, ethical, or philosophical boundaries
to change a patient’s core personality or self.
The  social  ambivalence  toward  psy-
chopharmaceuticals in the age of direct-to-
consumer  advertising  takes  the  form  of
constant demand for more promises about
the relationship between illness and science
versus the equally difficult attempt to regu-
late those promises to conform to science.
When  Prozac  first  became  commercially
available in the late 1980s, it was not sup-
posed to be inherently pleasurable, nor was
it supposed to be addictive, and it was used
for a widening range of depression and anx-
iety symptoms. With its growing use and
popularization came new questions — no
longer about the use of antidepressants to
cope with everyday stress and anxiety, but
about the use of antidepressants to shape
one’s personality and identity. Peter Kramer
famously articulated these questions in his
1993 book, Listening to Prozac [25]. In this
bestseller, Kramer expressed a new willing-
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sense of self. Given the apparent safety of
the drug, Kramer didn’t see this as medical
bravado so much as a perfectly reasonable
experiment made possible by the newest
generation  of  psychopharmacology.  He
asked rhetorically about a typical encounter
with one of his patients, “Who was I to with-
hold from her the bounties of science?” 
In the last 15 years, such romanticized
notions of SSRI antidepressants as safe op-
portunities to tweak a patient’s sense of self
with the latest science have received greater
public and regulatory scrutiny, from contro-
versies over their questionable efficacy to dra-
matically  reduced  uses  in  children  and
adolescents to the possible increased risk of
suicide from their use. And, as we have seen,
the rudimentary science of psychopharma-
ceuticals has itself been more fundamentally
critiqued.
Science And SymPtomS
While there is no standard definition of
“the placebo effect,” it is broadly used to des-
ignate symptom relief (e.g., pain, fatigue,
anxiety, depression) that occurs due to such
non-pharmacological components of a med-
ical intervention as patient expectation or en-
couraging  a  supportive  doctor-patient
relationship [26]. The placebo effect has been
especially troublesome for pharmaceutical
companies trying to demonstrate the efficacy
of antidepressants in clinical trials [14,15,27].
And yet, while this has led to the accusation
that the drug industry promotes psychophar-
maceuticals with questionable efficacy, the
situation has become more complicated, as
some drug marketers are now defending DTC
advertising as a way to enhance the placebo
effect, leading to better medication compli-
ance: “[A]dvertising strategies [that depict
obvious patient relief] not only create con-
sumer demand for the advertised products,
but may also create the emotionally condi-
tioned  responses  and  expectancies  instru-
mental to enhancing a placebo effect that
occurs when the medication is taken” [28].
Coincidentally or not, with the rise of
DTC marketing, some argue that the placebo
effect in depression has increased in recent
years [29]. But given such efforts on the part
of drug marketers to use advertising to bol-
ster the placebo effect, it is striking that the
clinical trial — which is what the FDA de-
mands of pharmaceutical companies to con-
nect their drugs to specific illness and prove
that their drugs work as advertised — delib-
erately avoids accounting for marketing it-
self. Clinical trial participants are typically
not told brand names of experimental drugs,
and they are not shown advertisements that
provide biological explanations of the drugs
and depict symptom relief. On the contrary,
drug companies worry about the placebo ef-
fect as a kind of psychological problematic
that must be reduced, not enhanced, and they
have gone so far as to screen out so-called
“placebo  responders”  in  sham  “placebo
washout” pre-trials, in which all participants
are placed on a placebo antidepressant, and
those who experience it as efficacious are
discarded from the real clinical trial [30,31].
Here we see a profound disconnect between
the protocol of a randomized double-blind
control trial that attempts to isolate a drug’s
real effect in the clinical trial, in part by re-
moving any advertising messages, versus
the attempt to actively generate and lever-
age the placebo effect through marketing. 
concluSionS
Psychopharmaceutical marketing par-
ticipates directly in debates over what is sci-
entifically known about mental illness, with
important ramifications for doctor-patient
interaction, and patient experiences with an-
tidepressants. Right now, antidepressant ad-
vertising  propagates  narrowly  biological
explanations of depression (especially the
seductive notion of simple neurochemical
imbalance or deficiency) and leaves out any
mention of how often symptom relief may
occur because of  non-pharmacological in-
terventions. At the same time, it would seem
that drug companies are using advertising
precisely to inflate such non-pharmacologi-
cal effects, with the goal of attracting con-
sumers to antidepressants, and then keeping
them on them. This disconnect between at-
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clinical trial versus attempts to bolster it
through advertising indicates a severe ten-
sion in a society that privileges medicalized
and scientific narratives about pharmaceuti-
cals on the one hand, but which on the other
hand  is  deeply  ambivalent  about  under-
standing our relationship to psychotropic
drugs. Indeed, if and how antidepressants
work is not a straightforward objective ques-
tion, but rather a larger social contest in-
volving  scientific  debate,  the  political
history of the pharmaceutical industry, cul-
tural  discourses  surrounding  the  role  of
drugs in society, and the interpretive flexi-
bility of personal experience. Therefore, we
need to be open to interpretations of psy-
chopharmaceutical action that acknowledge
them  as  psychologically  wily  substances
whose effects are both socially and pharma-
cologically  determined.  Drug  advertising
most certainly does not take these complex-
ities into account, so it is currently in the
hands of consumers and medical and policy
decision-makers to do so. 
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